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1. As used in this article, “plea bargaining” means the creation by the prosecutor or judge,
whether explicitly or implicitly, of an expectation of leniency that is subsequently honored in
exchange for the entry of a guilty plea.  “So long as defendants routinely expect to receive some
form of sentencing consideration in exchange for an admission of guilt, the essence of a system
of bargain justice is present.”  Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 509, 512 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining,
32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 97 (1989-1990) (study finding that large majority of Canadians opposes plea
bargaining because it treats defendants too leniently).
XXxAcademic commentators have also asserted this concern.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler,
The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652, 678-79 (1981) (asserting that plea
bargaining improperly abandons “the legitimate objectives of the criminal sanction”); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2009 (1992) (asserting that
“trials in open court and deserved sentences imposed by a neutral factfinder,” rather than “plea
negotiations,” further “the public interest in effective law enforcement and adequate punishment
of the guilty”).  However, undue leniency is the principal concern about plea bargaining
expressed by the public.
3. This criticism applies both to defendants who do not plead guilty and later receive
higher post-trial sentences and to those who accept the bargained plea and forfeit their right to
trial.  For examples of the former criticism, see Alschuler, supra note 2, at 680 (asserting that
the lack of penological justification for the disparities calls into question the fairness of post-
trial sentences); Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic’s Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
555, 564 (1979) (contending that plea bargaining unfairly penalizes those who go to trial); Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1407 (1970) (“The
burdens which plea bargaining imposes on the exercise of constitutional trial rights render the
practice unconstitutional.”).  For examples of the latter criticism, see Donald G. Gifford,
Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL.
L. REV. 37, 49 (“The reality of sentencing differentials is generally enough to deprive
defendants of any real choice in plea bargaining.”); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea
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I. Introduction
Plea bargaining has many critics.   The public tends to believe that1
bargaining treats defendants too leniently.   Academic commentators typically2
contend that bargaining treats defendants too cavalierly or too harshly.3
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Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 13 (1978) (“Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive.”);
Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 2009 (contending that plea bargaining “undercuts” the “due process
right to an adversarial trial” and “inflict[s] undeserved punishment on innocents who could win
acquittal at trial”).
4. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (emphasizing that plea
bargains “extend a benefit to a defendant” in part because he “demonstrates by his plea that he
is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind
that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise
be necessary”); cf. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (upholding the imposition of
increased sentence based on conclusion of trial judge that defendant committed perjury while
testifying in his own defense); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System,
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 315 (1983) (asserting that some defendants who are convicted at trial
perjure themselves or suborn perjury and, thus, warrant increased punishment).
5. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 662-67 (rebutting the notion that those who
bargain have more remorse or are better candidates for rehabilitation); see also Comment, The
Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204,
211-17 (1956) (contending that perjury at trial is not a valid reason for imposing an increased
sentence).
XXxArguments that those who accept deals usually deserve less punishment or demonstrate
greater rehabilitative potential also do not respond to some of the criticism of plea bargaining,
such as that bargaining coerces some innocent defendants to plead guilty.  For further discussion
of this criticism, see infra Part IV.B.
6. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1106 (1984) (“In the absence of concessions, most felony defendants do in fact demand a
trial . . . .”).
7. See, e.g., CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
667 (4th ed. 2000).
8. Plea bargaining has been held constitutional and endorsed on policy grounds by the
Supreme Court.  See Brady, 397 U.S. 742; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261
(1971) (asserting that “[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part
of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons”).
9. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 2463, 2469-96 (2004) (asserting that recent scholarship treats plea bargaining, like civil
case settlements, as bargaining “in the shadow of expected trial outcomes”).
Defenders of the practice have often sought to justify bargains on penological
grounds, but this argument is a hard sell.   Critics have cast serious doubt on4
the notion that those who accept deals usually deserve less punishment or
become better people than those convicted after trial.   Guilty pleas, mostly5
induced by government concessions,  remain the method by which the6
criminal justice system resolves approximately ninety percent of all criminal
cases in America.   Nonetheless, critics continue their assault on plea7
bargaining.8
Recently, a “shadow of trial” efficiency theory has gained prominence as
a way to rationalize plea bargaining.   This theory posits trial outcomes as the9
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10. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909 (1992).
11. The article credited with first presenting this theory of civil settlement is Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  Many subsequent articles have developed this idea with respect to civil
settlement.  See Bibas, supra note 9, at 2464 n.1 and authorities cited therein.
12. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1914-15 (using this economic theory to
provide “[t]he affirmative case for the enforceability of plea bargains”); id. at 1935 (asserting
that parties bargain over “adjudication costs” and “the risks of an uncertain future”).
13. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1969 (“So bargains are ethically attractive as
well as efficient.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1935 (contending that “parties bargain
over the allocation of criminal punishment in order to reassign and thereby reduce the risks of
an uncertain future” and describing the normative outcome as “an efficient contract that fully
exploits potential gains”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains,
Imperfect Trials and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2015 (1992) [hereinafter Scott
& Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains] (“Plea bargaining is, for the most part, efficient and fair.”).
14. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1915 (“Plea bargaining provides a means
by which prosecutors can obtain a larger net return from criminal convictions, holding resources
constant.”).
15. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1978 (endorsing plea bargaining and asserting
that “‘[i]mperfections’ in bargaining reflect the imperfections of an anticipated trial”); Scott &
Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains, supra note 13, at 2011-12 (asserting that parties “must contract in
the shadow of the enforcement regime” and that “[i]f the trial process is flawed — if trials
sometimes convict innocent defendants — bargaining will not fix the mistakes”).
16. See Bibas, supra note 9, at 2468.
measure by which plea bargains are assessed.   Based on perspectives earlier10
applied in the civil settlement context,  proponents claim that plea bargaining11
is justified because it largely mirrors the results that would have occurred after
a highly regulated trial process, discounted to reflect uncertainty and
adjudication costs.   Plea bargaining is “efficient”  in punishing crime if it12 13
achieves the same overall results as trials while expending fewer resources.14
Likewise, plea bargains are not systematically unfair to defendants if they only
reflect discounted results from a trial process that we accept as legitimate.15
Scholars who are critical of plea bargaining, however, have also begun to
use this shadow-of-trial efficiency theory to support arguments for abolition
or reform of the practice.  The debate focuses on impediments that distort plea
bargaining in ways that skew results away from accurately discounted trial
outcomes.  These impediments include structural problems surrounding the
plea bargaining process, such as information deficits, agency costs, poor
lawyering, pre-trial incarceration rules, and rigid sentencing mandates,  along16
with the many psychological disabilities of defendants, such as
“[o]verconfidence, self-serving biases, denial mechanisms . . . [and] risk
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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17. Id. at 2469.
18. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1948 (arguing that sometimes bargains are
“inefficient” because they “fail[] to exploit the risk reduction potential of defendants’ private
knowledge” regarding their odds of acquittal at trial).
XXxProfessor Stuntz has also more recently acknowledged that accurate discounting is very
often impeded.  See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548 (2004) (asserting that Professor Bibas’s “basic
claim  — that there are serious impediments to efficient bargaining in criminal cases — is true
and important”).
19. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1967 (recommending some minor reforms
to provide innocent defendants with better plea offers so as to help “reduce the harm to innocent
defendants and meanwhile reduce transaction costs and inefficiency for everyone else”).
20. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 9, at 2545 (“Further research must consider more
safeguards, such as discovery mechanisms, debiasing interventions, use of mediators or other
structured dispute resolution, and judicial involvement.”).
21. See Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1979 (“I argue that other flaws in the bargaining
structure, which Scott and Stuntz do not address, create massive problems of inefficiency and
unfairness.”); id. at 2009 (“Plea bargaining is a disaster.  It can, and should be, abolished.”).
22. The article does not address every argument that scholars have offered about the ill-
effects of bargaining on the criminal justice system.  See, e.g., Peter Aranella, Rethinking the
Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72
GEO. L.J. 185, 218-19 (1983) (discussing the tendency of plea bargaining to undermine the
special moral features of criminal law).
preferences.”   Some who have used the theory of discounted trial outcomes17
to argue for the legitimacy of plea bargaining have conceded that certain
structural problems render many bargains inefficient,  and they have tried to18
suggest some modest solutions.   However, critics of plea bargaining have19
urged that the impediments are sufficiently numerous and egregious to require
at least extraordinary reforms,  if not the abolition of plea bargaining.20 21
This article defends plea bargaining and, more importantly, shows why
shadow-of-trial efficiency theory fails to properly measure its effectiveness.22
The article demonstrates that trial outcomes accurately discounted for
uncertainty and adjudication costs are not the appropriate standard of
acceptable results from the perspectives of punishing crime or of treating
criminal defendants fairly.  In light of this conclusion, claims of structural or
psychological impediments that interfere with accurate discounting have little
relevance to whether to abolish or reform plea bargaining.  While shadow-of-
trial efficiency theory turns out to imply that plea bargaining is usually
inefficient and, thus, highly problematic, this article contends that bargaining
serves the interests of both society and criminal defendants.
The article addresses the three central concerns about plea bargaining.  Part
II confronts the criticism that bargaining typically harms the public interest by
failing to impose sufficient punishment for crime.  Part III focuses on the
claim that bargaining effectively penalizes the exercise of trial rights by
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/3
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23. While the article opposes shadow-of-trial efficiency as a measure for evaluating plea
bargaining, it does not oppose reforms.  Plea bargaining is not systematically unfair.  However,
courts might consider, for example, following practices through which they could more often
accommodate sentencing reductions in plea-bargained cases with theories of remorse and
apology.  See generally Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004).
24. The forms of plea bargaining vary among jurisdictions.  See generally WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 956, 989 (3d ed. 2000).
In many locales, the bargain is between the prosecution and the defense, with the judge merely
exercising veto power.  The bargaining may occur over the charge and over recommendations
to the judge about sentencing.  Alternatively, the bargaining may determine the precise sentence
to be imposed, with the judge’s disagreement constituting a nullification of the bargain.  See id.
defendants who are sentenced after trial.  Part IV addresses the claim that
bargaining unduly coerces or otherwise mistreats defendants who plead guilty,
some of whom are innocent.  Each part of this article shows that the shadow-
of-trial efficiency theory tends to confuse rather than enlighten thinking about
the problem.  Although typically inefficient under shadow-of-trial theory, plea
bargaining maximizes deserved punishment at a reasonable cost and generally
treats defendants fairly.23
II. Plea Bargaining and the Social Interest in Punishing Crime
This part makes the case that plea bargaining serves rather than undermines
the public interest in punishing crime, but, more importantly, shows that
shadow-of-trial efficiency theory does not help us resolve this question.  This
part begins by demonstrating that, given the basic constraints of our current
criminal-justice system, plea bargaining tends to maximize punishment across
cases regardless of whether participants in the bargaining process accurately
discount trial outcomes.  In so demonstrating, this part assumes the following
constraints: (1) the amount of conduct defined as crime, (2) the amount of
resources devoted to policing, adjudication, and incarceration, and (3) our
constitutionalized approach to criminal trials.  This part then takes up the
question of whether we should change the constraints to abolish bargaining
and, thereby, allow for greater punishment in cases that would have been
bargained.  Although this part concludes that we should not pursue abolition,
its larger point is that shadow-of-trial theory does not accurately explain the
utility of plea bargaining.
A. The Punishment-Maximizing Value of Plea Bargaining Under the
Existing Constraints of Our Criminal Justice System
Prosecutors and judges work to ensure that plea bargaining, relative to
trials, does not shortchange the public interest in punishment.24
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
604 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:599
at 956.  In some locales, judges participate in actual plea bargaining, and, although there was
once “a general consensus” against it, “further movement in this direction can be expected.”
Id. at 989.
25. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1987 (noting that “[t]he District Attorney is
usually an elected official”).
26. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2002, tbl.1.89 (Kathleen Maguire & Anne L. Pastore eds., 2004) (noting
that voters elect trial judges in thirty-nine states).
27. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1987 (asserting that “whether elected or
appointed,” the goal of the District Attorney “is to enhance her reputation and political
standing”).
28. See, e.g., Note, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 115, 133 (1997) (noting that “[v]ictims have a tremendous emotional stake in seeing
that perpetrators of crimes against them receive appropriate punishment”).
29. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 3, at 44-45 (contending, based on empirical studies, that
prosecutors through bargaining “attempt to individualize justice by taking into account the
circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the offender”).
30. See, e.g., id. at 61-62 (“Prosecutors obviously possess varying temperaments,
viewpoints toward certain kinds of crimes, and levels of enthusiasm for going to trial.”).
31. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 205 (“If forced to prove the guilt of every
defendant in a judicial proceeding, the prosecutor, with his limited staff and budget, would be
hampered in his enforcement of criminal law.”).
Circumstances vary from one jurisdiction to another regarding the nature of
their political accountability.  However, in almost all states, District Attorneys
are elected,  as are trial judges in the vast majority of states.   Even in states25 26
in which prosecutors or judges are appointed, elected officials generally
appoint ambitious lawyers who hope to be reappointed or to be appointed or
elected to another position in the future.   They generally give due regard to27
public concern about leniency in plea bargaining.  Apart from their political
motivations, they must also sympathize with the view, regularly reinforced by
crime victims,  that criminals should receive their deserved punishment.28
Because of these motivations, prosecutors and judges will weigh what they
perceive as the deserved punishment  against the benefits they see in a29
disposition by plea.  Officials measure deserved punishments differently; the
perceived benefits of a guilty plea vary from one case to the next, and
jurisdictions vary regarding perceptions of the need to promote guilty pleas
generally.   Nonetheless, prosecutors and judges prefer higher sentences to30
lower sentences, up to the sentence that they believe the defendant actually
deserves.
Prosecutors and judges willingly trade some deserved punishment in
individual cases to maximize the punishments they can secure.  They must
make this trade-off because they have limited resources.   The trade-off works31
because convictions by jury trial require far more of their resources than
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/3
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32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 561-62 (4th ed. 1992).
33. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1977, at 102, 102 (noting that a plea bargain will “save the state the
time, effort, and risk entailed in the trial of the accusation”).
34. Regarding the varying forms of plea bargaining among jurisdictions, see supra note 24
and accompanying text.
35. This hypothetical understates the average time required for a jury trial and overstates
the average time required for a guilty plea.  See infra text accompanying notes 36-37.
bargained guilty pleas and because both parties in a criminal case have
incentives to avoid the uncertainties of litigation.   Prosecutors and judges32
could try always to seek the maximum deserved punishment, but most
defendants would demand a jury trial, and, assuming no changes in the
governing constraints, the system would quickly become inadequate.  Courts
would necessarily dismiss cases in which legitimate charges had been filed
due to the inability to prosecute them.  Furthermore, prosecutors would
decline to bring charges in many legitimate cases.  Given these circumstances,
prosecutors and judges maximize punishment by extending some leniency for
guilty pleas.  They obtain a certain conviction with some punishment in the
case at hand and a large time savings that can be used to prosecute other
cases.33
Plea bargains bring about an enormous punishment-maximizing effect.
Suppose that we are in a jurisdiction in which the prosecutor bargains not only
over charges and sentencing recommendations but actual sentences, with the
judge merely holding veto power.   Assume that a prosecutor has six armed34
robbery cases to prosecute, among many others.  She has spoken to the six
defense lawyers and concluded that each case carries a ten percent chance of
acquittal, but that the deserved and probable sentence for each defendant after
a jury-trial conviction is fifteen years of imprisonment.  The maximum
possible sentence is twenty years, and no mandatory-minimum sentencing
requirement applies.  She concludes that each case will require six hours of
court time for a jury trial and one hour of court time for a guilty-plea
hearing.   In a six-hour period, she could try one case and, hopefully, secure35
a conviction, which would probably result in a fifteen-year sentence.  The
other five defendants would not be prosecuted.  Alternatively, in that same
period, she could proceed with six guilty plea hearings and obtain certain
convictions.  Suppose that the prosecutor knows that each defendant would
accept a plea bargain if it carried only five years of imprisonment.  Which
option better serves the public interest in punishing crime?  Obviously, six
pleas at five years apiece is better than a ninety percent possibility of a single
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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36. There are also greater incapacitation benefits from incarcerating the six defendants for
five years each rather than the single defendant for fifteen years.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.  Certain influences, of course, may also
temper the prosecutor’s zeal.  See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1987-88 (noting reasons
why prosecutors sometimes will want to pursue guilty pleas to further personal interests rather
than to maximize deserved punishment); Gifford, supra note 3, at 65-68 (asserting that
prosecutors may often be lenient because of the amorphous nature of the “public interest” as
compared with the more concrete interests of the individual defendant).
fifteen-year sentence.  The goal of maximizing punishments compellingly
favors bargaining.36
The punishment-maximizing effect of bargained pleas over trials is much
greater in reality than even this hypothetical reveals.  The average jury trial
requires substantially more than six hours and also involves several pre-trial
hearings and much preparation time by the prosecutor.  Likewise, the average
guilty plea hearing requires well under an hour and minimal preparation.
With the very conservative assumptions in the hypothetical, plea bargains still
produced twice as much total punishment as any possible punishment that
would be produced by the trial.  The punishment differential would increase
exponentially if we used more realistic assumptions.
This hypothetical also shows that bargaining will usually maximize
punishment vis-à-vis jury trials even if the prosecutor does not pursue the
highest possible sentence she could have obtained without scuttling the plea.
All of the defendants in the hypothetical might easily have accepted ten-year
or even twelve-year bargains, and the prosecutor would likely have had
incentives to seek those higher sentences.   However, the punishment-37
maximizing power of plea bargaining is so great that even unnecessary and
fairly extreme leniency by the prosecutor will not subvert the punishment-
maximizing effect of deals.  Bargaining will still produce more punishment
than trials.
Variances among defendants in the distribution of leniency will also not
affect the conclusion that pleas produce more punishment than trials.  Suppose
that, instead of offering each defendant a five-year deal, the prosecutor offered
two of them nine years, two others five years, and the final two only one year,
and each accepted.  This distribution of leniency appears irrational under the
posited circumstances.  However, the results of the plea option still seem more
rational than the results of the trial option, where all of the punishment would
fall on a single defendant.  Moreover, the better choice for purposes of
maximizing deserved punishment remains the plea bargains.
Given these observations, it is clear that the shadow-of-trial efficiency
theory has no practical bearing on whether pleas, as opposed to jury trials,
maximize deserved punishment.  Surely, prosecutors often weigh the probable
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss4/3
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38. This evaluation of adjudication costs is highly subjective.  The list of factors that might
be included is broad, covering not merely the prosecutor’s time and effort but also the costs to
others, including the prosecutorial support staff, the court personnel, the jurors and the
witnesses.  Unlike the discounting of outcome uncertainties (expected post-trial sentence
discounted by the fractional odds of acquittal), the value of these adjudication costs in
sentencing terms is not calculable by any objective formula.
39. The defense might nix a deal if the prosecutor’s final offer is too high.  However, this
problem is not one that correlates with undue leniency in plea bargaining.  The problem also
does not reveal injustice to the defendant who decides to proceed to a jury trial.  See infra Part
III.
40. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1935 (asserting that “parties bargain over
the allocation of criminal punishment in order to reassign and thereby reduce the risks of an
uncertain future” and describing the goal as that of reaching “an efficient contract that fully
exploits potential gains”); see id. at 1915 (“Moreover, the gains the participants realize from the
exchange presumably have social value, not just value to the bargaining parties.”).
outcome of the potential trial in deciding how much leniency to extend in a
plea deal.  They also surely consider factors related to adjudication costs,
particularly how much of their time the case would require.   However, the38
accuracy of these judgments is irrelevant as a practical matter to whether
bargaining, compared to trials, provides undue leniency.  If only two guilty
pleas could be traded for one jury-trial conviction, the accuracy of discounting
efforts would matter, but not where the trade-off is far higher than six.  The
prosecutor in our hypothetical could arrive at bargain decisions by rolling
dice, and bargaining would almost certainly still maximize punishments far
more than a policy of no bargaining.39
Within the constraints of our current system, shadow-of-trial efficiency
theory turns out to be an inappropriate measure even for maximizing deserved
punishments among plea-bargained cases.  The theory posits that expected
trial and post-trial sentencing outcomes, accurately discounted to reflect
uncertainty and adjudication costs, define efficient plea bargaining.   But why40
should the societal goal be to secure no more than the accurately discounted
trial outcome?  To maximize deserved punishments, we would prefer the
highest deserved punishment the prosecutor could obtain on a plea, regardless
of whether the defendant seems sensible in accepting the bargain.  Suppose
that the prosecutor in our hypothetical could secure plea bargains of fourteen
years imprisonment from each defendant.  The bargains might be inefficient
in the sense that the defendants misjudged their chances of acquittal or their
probable post-trial sentences.  However, if the societal goal is to maximize
deserved punishment, their blunder brings about positive results.
The shadow-of-trial efficiency theory misleads us in evaluating plea
bargaining.  The theory implies that plea bargaining is socially valuable only
to the extent that it reflects accurately discounted trial outcomes.  However,
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41. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 2; Bibas, supra note 9.
42. While Professor Bibas concludes that plea bargaining is, as a practical matter, here to
stay and, thus, that we should focus on reforms, see Bibas, supra note 9, at 2547, his critique
of the practice reveals too many fundamental impediments to accurate, shadow-of-trial
bargaining to make achievement of that goal possible. 
43. There is a tendency to believe that “efficiency” is an important factor in deciding social
questions.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 32, at 13 (“Although . . . efficiency [is not] . . . the
only worthwhile criterion of social choice, . . . most people probably would agree[] it is an
important criterion.”).
44. See Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1979 (asserting that “plea bargaining seriously impairs
the public interest in effective punishment of crime” and that “flaws in the bargaining
structure . . . create massive problems of inefficiency”); id. at 2009 (asserting that plea
bargaining should be “abolished”).
45. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1914-15 (“Since it is difficult to know a priori
which party enjoys the comparative advantage in risk reduction, a policy of contractual
autonomy is the only way that parties can reduce the social losses that result from uncertainty
and frustrated expectations.”); see also id. at 1940 (asserting that an “efficient allocation of risks
and entitlements” can “generate net social gains”).
46. The shadow-of-trial standard is at least an unhelpful, if not inappropriate, measure of
efficiency regarding plea bargaining.  See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 641, 646-48 (1982) (discussing the difficulty of defining the efficiency criterion in
economic analyses of law).
47. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 9, at 2547 (“We cannot demolish the huge edifice of plea
bargaining . . . .”).
Professors Schulhofer and Bibas have shown why plea bargaining generally
does not produce such outcomes.   Their critiques also reveal that it probably41
never will, regardless of reform efforts.   One could easily conclude from this42
analysis that plea bargaining should be ended.   Professor Schulhofer has43
made this very argument.   Even those who have used the shadow-of-trial44
efficiency theory to defend bargaining have posited that there are “social
losses”  to inefficient bargains.  However, because this efficiency standard45
actually does not correspond to the social gains and losses associated with
plea bargaining,  we should not judge the validity of plea bargaining from our46
failure to achieve it.
B. The Cost of Eliminating Plea Bargaining by Changing One or More of
the Constraints of Our Current System
While plea bargaining maximizes deserved punishment within the
constraints of the current criminal justice system, the next question is whether
the benefits of maximizing sentences over all criminal cases justify changing
the constraints themselves.  By eliminating bargaining, courts could increase
the punishment imposed in cases that would otherwise be bargained and, thus,
the level of deserved punishment imposed across all prosecutions.  Bargaining
is now pervasive and often considered intractable,  but we could, in theory,47
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48. See Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1107 (pointing to the Philadelphia system and
concluding that “[p]lea bargaining is not inevitable”).
49. Id. at 1051 (noting that “45% were disposed of by guilty plea, 49% by bench trial, and
6% by jury trial”).
50. The study determined that the jury-trial waiver colloquies and subsequent bench trials
combined averaged only forty-five minutes while the guilty pleas averaged twenty minutes.  Id.
at 1085. 
51. See id. at 1062-63 (noting that “sentencing differentials between jury and bench trials
are marked”).
eliminate much of it.  Doing so, however, would come with a high price.  This
section contends that the cost of abolition would be unjustifiably expensive,
but, more importantly, it shows that shadow-of-trial efficiency theory, again,
does not help resolve whether to abolish bargaining.
1. The Unavoidable Trade-Offs
Attempting to eliminate plea bargaining would involve costly trade-offs.
The previous section assumed a system that would exchange guilty pleas for
trials by not proceeding against many defendants who had previously been
legitimately charged with crime or by not charging many who should be
charged.  To attempt to abolish plea bargaining in any other way would
require changes in the constraints noted at the outset of this part — the amount
of behavior defined as crime, the amount of public resources devoted to
fighting crime, and the basic approach to criminal trials.  Moreover,
bargaining is so central to the current system of adjudicating crime that
abolishing it would necessitate extraordinary changes.
Some commentators have suggested that abolition could be achieved
without major costs, but their proposals are illusory.  For example, based on
a study of Philadelphia courts, one leading critic of plea bargaining contended
that short bench trials could almost entirely replace plea bargains as the
secondary means for resolving criminal cases.   According to the study itself,48
this conclusion was probably too optimistic.  Nearly half of the cases in the
Philadelphia courts ended with a guilty plea based on either explicit
concessions from the prosecutor or implicit concessions from the judge.49
Also, the trade-off of guilty pleas for bench trials was arguably only a triumph
of form over substance.  The bench trials were extremely short — generally
only a few minutes longer than a guilty plea  — and judges richly rewarded50
jury waivers through sentencing concessions.   The Philadelphia system could51
be viewed as merely an effort by judges to reward jury waivers and to allow
for the correction of prosecutorial overcharging where the prosecutor, for
reasons particular to that city, did not provide these functions through
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52. Professor Schulhofer cited among other factors that “[o]vert prosecutorial plea
bargaining has long been discouraged and, to an extent, viewed with suspicion” and that
“[a]ggressive prosecutorial policies and refusals to compromise have engendered equally
uncooperative attitudes among defense counsel.”  Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1099.
53. The Philadelphia system provided plea bargains in a non-narrow sense.  See supra note
1.  Because the central criticisms of plea bargaining apply to this broad definition of bargaining,
one cannot persuasively claim to have responded to those central criticisms by eliminating only
the plea bargaining that would be included in a narrow definition of the practice. 
54. While Professor Schulhofer urged that the bench trials were usually genuinely
adversarial contests in which some acquittals occurred, these points provide weak support for
emulating this system.  First, plea negotiations themselves are also often adversarial in important
respects and often result in the dismissal of questionable charges.  Second, Professor
Schulhofer’s description of the average length of bench trials, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text, demonstrates that bench trials were far more cursory than trials that afford
constitutional protections for the defendant.  Further, this system hardly honored more than
plea-bargaining systems the notion embodied in our Constitution that juries are important, given
that only six percent of the cases were resolved by jury trial.  See supra note 49.
55. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 116-17 (2002) (asserting that “bargains are not inevitable” and urging “the substitution
of hard prosecutorial screening practices for the use of plea bargains”).
56. Id. at 115.
57. See id. at 68 (noting that seventy-eight percent of all filed cases resulted in either a trial
or a plea of guilty as charged).
58. Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading
Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1407 (2003) (contending that the initial screener cannot evaluate
a case nearly as effectively as the prosecutor who later ends up assigned to handle it and who
reviews it more carefully). 
bargaining.   The system did not eliminate bargaining for actual guilty pleas52 53
and, to the extent that it reduced such bargaining, arguably only substituted an
essentially equivalent method for extending leniency to reward purely
strategic behavior by defendants.54
Other efforts at abolition have turned out to be both illusory and costly.
One study pointed to the results of a system implemented in New Orleans by
then head prosecutor, Harry Connick.   This study showed that Connick had55
greatly reduced the number of plea bargains offered by his office through a
plan of intensive screening at the charging stage.   The New Orleans District56
Attorney’s office rejected many charges that prosecutors would have filed in
most other cities.  The office also routinely declined to offer bargains, leaving
the defendant to decide whether to go to trial or to plead guilty to the original
charge.   Doubtless, a tough screening policy by the prosecutor can somewhat57
reduce the need to dismiss questionable charges later.  Due to the difficulty of
accurately assessing cases, however, attempts at tough screening may allow
a large percentage of questionable cases to go forward while also foreclosing
many other legitimate charges.   This approach may also have little influence58
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59. See Wright & Miller, supra note 55, at 74.  While conclusions cannot easily be drawn
as to whether too many charges were screened out, evaluating a tough screening policy certainly
involves asking whether the policy adequately addressed the crime problem in New Orleans. 
60. See id. at 72.
61. See id. at 81-82.
62. See id. at 80.
63. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 989-91 (discussing the long-standing arguments,
though expressing doubts about their persuasiveness, that judges should not be involved in plea
bargaining).
64. See Wright & Miller, supra note 55, at 80 (implicitly noting that the judge would often
tell the defense attorney in pre-trial discussions what sentence the defendant would receive after
a guilty plea).
65. While large caseloads and the promise of cumbersome, expensive jury trials help
explain the appeal of plea bargains from a societal perspective, some commentators have found
the more driving explanation in the motivations of key courtroom actors.  These theories vary
in emphasis, but center around a persistent preference for cooperation to achieve self-serving
benefits among trial judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and defendants.  Compare Malcolm
M. Feeley, Two Models of the Criminal Justice System: An Organizational Perspective, 7 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 407 (1973) (presenting a theory based on the structure of relationships and
functions among courtroom participants), with MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 2-6
(1978) (proposing an adaptation theory focusing on a socialization process of courtroom actors).
Further, some have argued that plea bargaining became entrenched in our system through a
complex set of developments, including the rise of probation and of the public defender, along
with the failure of indeterminate sentencing.  See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH
2-3 (2003).  Nonetheless, it appears that plea bargaining started to develop a firm toe-hold in
America around 1850, after Massachusetts passed liquor laws that vastly increased criminal
prosecutions.  Prosecutors sought “to manage their crushing workloads and to gain an
occasional effortless conviction.”  Id. at 230.
on bargaining.  The New Orleans District Attorney’s office “reject[ed] for
prosecution . . . 52% of all cases and 63% of all charges.”   Nonetheless, the59
approach did not come close to eliminating bargaining.  First, the authors were
careful to note that charge bargaining by prosecutors may have occurred in up
to twenty-two percent of the cases,  and some additional bargaining seemed60
to occur in the form of failures by the prosecution to pursue enhanced
penalties under habitual felon statutes.   Much more significantly, overt61
sentence bargaining continued in almost all cases between judges and defense
lawyers,  a practice historically deemed problematic even by proponents of62
plea bargaining.   In the end, the study failed to show that plea bargaining is63
eradicable through tough screening practices.   Instead, it raised the question64
whether tough screening forecloses too many valid prosecutions and suggested
that a void in plea bargaining by prosecutors will tend to be filled with plea
bargaining by judges.
Efforts to simply ban most plea bargains have also repeatedly failed, surely
in part because of the expensive trade-offs involved.   Sometimes ban efforts65
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66. The constitutional amendment, Proposition 8, was approved by referendum on June 8,
1982.  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.  Section 7 of Proposition 8 also addresses the prohibition
of plea bargaining in certain circumstances.  See  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(a) (West 2004).
67. See Michael L. Rubinstein & Teresa J. White, Plea Bargaining: Can Alaska Live
Without It?, 62 JUDICATURE 266 (1978).
68. See Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1987).
69. For another example, see Milton Heumann & Colin Loftin, Mandatory Sentencing and
the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: The Michigan Felony Firearm Statute, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
393 (1979), discussing an effort by the Wayne County (Detroit) prosecutor to eliminate plea
bargaining by his office in any case involving a recently promulgated law that imposed a
mandatory add-on sentence of two years for the use of a firearm while committing a felony.
70. In California, for example, the ban did not eliminate plea bargaining, because it only
applied in Superior Court.  As a result, plea bargaining shifted to the earlier stages of
adjudication — the municipal or district courts — where most cases began.  CANDACE MCCOY,
POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIM’S RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 37-38 (1993).
71. For example, in Alaska, judges gave implicit bargains to those who pled guilty.  For
violent crimes, a study found that sentences after trial were, on average, “445 per cent longer
than those given after pleas” and for fraud crimes, “334 per cent longer.”  Rubinstein & White,
supra note 67, at 278.  A subsequent study also showed that charge bargaining again became
increasingly more common in Alaska beginning in the mid-1980s.  See Theresa White Carns
& Dr. John A. Kruse, A Re-Evaluation of Alaska’s Plea Bargaining Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 27,
64 (1991).
72. In El Paso, for example, a study found that, during the two years after the ban was
initially implemented, “the trial rate doubled and the two judges [assigned to criminal cases]
found that they could not move a much enlarged caseload.”  Weninger, supra note 68, at 311.
Soon, ten judges in the city began helping with criminal cases, but, nonetheless, the ban
essentially fell apart due to sub rosa bargaining at all levels of the prosecutor’s office and the
tendency of judges to bargain.  Id. at 312.
73. When the prosecutor in Detroit tried to ban plea bargaining in felony cases involving
firearms, see Heumann & Loftin, supra note 69, judges participated in subterfuges of two sorts.
First, often by preagreement, they held short jury-waived trials in which the defendant was
found not guilty of the felony, thus nullifying the mandatory additional penalty of two years
applicable to felony cases involving firearms.  See id. at 417-19.  Second, they simply reduced
have resulted from legislation or referenda, such as a statewide prohibition
imposed in California in the early 1980s.   More often, they have resulted66
from the order of the chief prosecutor, such as with the ban imposed by the
Alaska Attorney General in 1975.   Most have occurred in rural areas with a67
low volume of criminal prosecutions, although the prosecutor in El Paso,
Texas, also attempted to impose such a ban in 1975.   Almost all have been68
limited in major ways, such as to prosecutors alone or to certain stages of the
adjudication process or to certain types of crimes.   In each case, either the69
bargaining shifted to other stages in the adjudication process,  the provision70
of bargains merely shifted from prosecutors to judges,  or prosecutors71
increasingly ignored the ban  or subverted it through subterfuges.   In the72 73
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two years from the sentence that would otherwise have been given for the underlying felony.
See id. at 417-24.
74. Because of the cumbersome pace of trials, plea agreements have also recently become
common in international war crimes tribunals.  See Julian A. Cook, Plea Bargaining at The
Hague, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 473, 475 (2005).
75. See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78
MICH L. REV. 204 (1979); Langbein, supra note 3, at 21-22.
76. Langbein, supra note 75, at 206-10.
77. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis
of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 549 (1997).
78. See id. at 549-50 (noting that, by the 1990s, “an estimated 20-30 percent of all German
criminal cases [were] disposed of by some form of bargain”).  
79. Some commentators have contended, however, that the resources required to provide
jury trials for all felony defendants are not as high as typically imagined and that such a system
is not beyond our means.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931,
936, 948 (1983).
modern era no large city in the United States has gone for a long period
without some form of widely practiced plea bargaining.  This history
underscores the costliness of eliminating bargaining.74
One leading critic of plea bargaining, Professor John Langbein, has openly
confronted the unavoidable trade-offs required to try to eliminate it.  He
argued in the late 1970s that the United States should emulate the West
German system of criminal justice.   According to the argument, the West75
Germans had avoided bargaining by resolving every case through a rapid, non-
adversarial trial.   This contention later appeared to be inaccurate.   Plea76 77
bargaining reportedly emerged in the West German system in the 1970s and
has gained popularity there since that time.   In any event, the argument78
reveals the kind of sacrifice required to try to end the practice.  To adopt the
German system would eviscerate not only plea bargaining but our basic
approach to criminal trials, which the Constitution guarantees to criminal
defendants.79
2. The Argument for Preserving Bargaining
The argument against fundamental systemic change to try to eliminate plea
bargaining rests largely on the uncertain, although clearly substantial, costs
involved.  If jury trials produce results that we like, while plea bargaining
produces results that we do not, we may prefer jury trials although they are
more expensive.  However, achieving a balance between results and costs is
preferable where the cost of perfection is exorbitant.  The argument for plea
bargaining reflects this perspective.  The costs of eliminating bargaining,
although difficult to quantify, are plausibly thought to far outweigh the costs
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80. The determination of whether to change the current constraints of our criminal justice
system to eliminate plea bargaining involves value preferences. The positives and negatives on
either side of the equation are not readily calculable in monetary terms and would not be
assigned the same value by all persons.  What is the value to be placed, for example, on the
preservation of the right to jury trial for the criminally accused?  What is the value to be placed
on the satisfaction that many would feel in knowing that more criminal defendants received their
full deserved punishment?  People will disagree about these questions.  However, the lack of
realistic efforts to eliminate plea bargaining indicates that the costs of elimination are generally
deemed too high.  
81. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 3, at 96 (“[T]o replace the criminal justice system as it
exists in the United States with an inquisitional system similar to those on the European
continent is both politically infeasible and potentially fatal to rights traditionally regarded as
fundamental in this country.”).
82. This option could also carry significant added costs.  The system would avoid the
expense associated with our current complex jury trials.  However, “even slimmed-down,
cheaper trials [would] be more expensive than bargained pleas.”  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10,
at 1932.  The increased level of punishment imposed would also carry increased incarceration
costs.
83. The idea, however, of cutting back somewhat on the use of the criminal sanction has
had prominent academic backers.  See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
84. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1932 (noting that, even if only a third of the
current number of guilty pleas were thought to result from bargaining, eliminating bargaining
“would quadruple the number of criminal trials”).
of leniency in punishment that result from continuing to allow it.  The
perceived imbalance in costs surely helps explain the lack of truly successful
efforts in recent decades to end bargaining.80
All of the options for eliminating plea bargaining are infeasible in practice.
Amending the Constitution to entitle criminal defendants to only short, non-
adversarial, non-jury trials is too controversial itself to serve as a remedy for
leniency in bargaining.   The negative consequences associated with this81
alternative begin with its tendency to promote erroneous trial convictions.82
The notion of decriminalizing a large portion of the behavior currently deemed
criminal is at least equally extreme.  At best, legislatures might marginally
stem the continuing expansion in the use of the criminal sanction.   The only83
remaining option focuses on money, and the increases would have to be
enormous.  Current police, court, and corrections budgets would have to
increase at least several times over.   As for the practicalities of this latter84
approach, the only uncertainty is whether it is significantly less implausible
than the other two potential remedies.
A large infusion of resources also might not eliminate plea bargaining.  The
scarcity of resources is not the only driving force behind bargaining, although
resource scarcity helps fuel the practice.  The key players involved —
prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, and defendants — have incentives to
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85. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 32, at 562 (noting that the incidence of plea bargaining
“is . . . determined by the relative costs of negotiation and of litigation and by the amount of
uncertainty over the outcome of litigation — factors not greatly affected by the number of
judges”).
86. If resources remained plentiful so that caseloads remained low, prosecutors and judges
could then work at a leisurely pace, which many of them might prefer. 
87. On this score, see supra note 73, regarding a subterfuge that developed to avoid a plea
bargain ban implemented by the Detroit prosecutor for certain felonies involving firearms, and
supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text, regarding the system that developed in Philadelphia
to make up for the reduced level of traditional plea bargaining.
88. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
bargain merely because pleas are so much cheaper and easier than trials, and
because litigation is fraught with uncertainty.   A substantial cost differential85
between pleas and trials would remain even if there were more resources
available for adjudication.   Likewise, the uncertainty of litigation would86
remain.  Therefore, the parties would often still want to bargain.  Bans might
temporarily help deter the practice.  However, given the continuing incentives
to deal, the parties would likely turn to subterfuges that produced the
equivalent of plea bargains.87
Shadow-of-trial efficiency theory does not help decide whether to abolish
bargaining.  The arguments offered here against such efforts do not build on
that theory.  Likewise, nothing about that theory undermines these arguments.
The shadow-of-trial efficiency theory in no way relates to this larger question
because it assumes that the adjudication costs of trials are appropriately traded
for leniency in sentencing.   Based on that assumption, the theory focuses on88
the degree of sentencing discount that will produce a purportedly “efficient”
bargain.  The theory does not address whether bargains should always be
disallowed to try to ensure that every criminal defendant receives his
maximum deserved punishment.  This part of the article has argued against
such a trade-off, but its larger point is that shadow-of-trial efficiency theory
does not help resolve this question.
III. Fairness to Defendants Who Are Sentenced After Trial
While plea bargaining serves the public interest in punishing crime at a
reasonable cost, there may be other reasons for paying the price to eliminate
it.  One might conclude that bargaining is too often unfair to defendants, either
those who do not accept bargains or those who do.  This article now turns to
the first of these unfairness questions, involving defendants who go to trial.
Critics claim that defendants who are sentenced after a trial conviction
without benefit of a bargain are effectively punished for exercising their right
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89. See supra note 3.
90. 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
91. The decision is excerpted and discussed in leading casebooks and treatises on criminal
procedure.  See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1303-04 (11th ed. 2005); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, at
960-61.
92. Scott, 419 F.2d at 277 (distinguishing a bargain that merely reflects “the uncertainties
of litigation” from one that “deter[s] defendants from demanding a trial”).
93. Id. at 276 (“To the extent that the bargain struck reflects only the uncertainty of
conviction before trial, the ‘expected sentence before trial’ — length of sentence discounted by
probability of conviction — is the same for those who decide to plead guilty and those who
hope for acquittal but risk conviction by going to trial.”).
to a jury trial.   This part contends, however, that they are not punished for89
exercising their constitutional rights, but for their crimes, and it does so
without reliance on shadow-of-trial efficiency theory.  This part begins by
demonstrating why one well-known judicial effort to use shadow-of-trial
efficiency theory to rebut this criticism of plea bargaining is ill-considered.
It then offers a theory of deserved punishment for crime to explain why plea
bargains do not render post-trial sentences unjust.
A. The Futility of Efforts to Deny the Disparities or to View Them as Tied
Only to Outcome Uncertainties
If plea bargaining focused only on the uncertainty of conviction at trial, the
practice could easily be thought not to punish the exercise of trial rights by
defendants sentenced after trial.  Bargains would not account for the
adjudication costs associated with trial.  Each plea bargain would be
determined simply by multiplying the expected trial-conviction sentence by
the fractional probability of acquittal.  Under this scenario, post-trial sentences
would not carry a trial penalty.  The disparity between bargained sentences
and post-trial sentences would be explained not by the relinquishment versus
exercise of trial rights, but by the possibility versus lost possibility of
acquittal.
In Scott v. United States,  an opinion that continues to receive attention,90 91
Judge David Bazelon used this shadow-of-trial notion to contend that plea
bargaining need not improperly penalize defendants who are sentenced after
trial.  He asserted that post-trial sentences do not carry a trial penalty if
bargains reflect only the uncertainty of conviction.   Judge Bazelon portrayed92
such bargains as simply reflecting the “expected sentence before trial,” which
he characterized as “the same” for those who accept the bargain and those
who go to trial.   He did not provide a good explanation about why plea offers93
that account for both the uncertainties of litigation and adjudication costs
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94. For his explanation and a discussion of its flaws, see infra text accompanying notes
137-38.
95. Judge Bazelon’s theory also fails, however, to the extent that it requires accurate
discounting for uncertainty.  His language seemed to demand such accuracy.  See, e.g., Scott,
419 F.2d at 277 (“If the sentence expectations of those two classes at that time are the same,
then there will be no chilling effect upon exercise of the right to trial, and it is accurate to say
that ‘no price’ has been placed upon the exercise of the right.”).  On this view, Judge Bazelon’s
theory would fail because of the likelihood that parties often cannot accurately determine the
probability of acquittal, even assuming they focus on it exclusively.  See supra text
accompanying notes 16-17; see also Note, supra note 3, at 1401 (“But the prosecutor does not
have sufficient information to make those predictions accurately.”).  The impediments to
accurate bargaining would imply that the practice is generally problematic.
XXxHowever, Judge Bazelon may only have meant that prosecutors, in extending plea offers,
should have the goal of discounting exclusively for the possibility of acquittal.  That view does
not require accuracy in the calculations.  Some of Judge Bazelon’s language suggested that he
was concerned primarily about intentions.  See, e.g., Scott, 419 F.2d at 277 (“The situation is
quite different when the prosecutor engages in bargaining not because he is willing to take a
sure half loaf rather than to await the outcome of a trial, but because his limited resources
convince him he must deter defendants from demanding a trial.”). If this is what Judge Bazelon
meant, his theory obviously departed from the accuracy demands of a strict, shadow-of-trial
efficiency theory.  However, his theory would still fail due to its implausible assumption that
government actors would not try to discount for adjudication costs avoided.
96. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 3, at 43-44 (asserting that outcome uncertainties are often
less important than expected adjudication costs); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1949 (“In
the typical case, the gains from trade are straightforward — savings in adjudication costs — and
the bargaining dynamic is relatively uncomplicated.”); Comment, supra note 5, at 219 (“Many
judges expressed the belief that a defendant pleading guilty should receive some reduction in
the gravity of sentence because of the role of guilty pleas in the efficient and economical
administration of criminal law.”).
97. See Gifford, supra note 3, at 43-44; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1949; Comment,
supra note 5, at 219.
98. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 309 (“The defendant, who buys the plea, pays
by surrendering his right to impose costs on the prosecutor by demanding trial and by
improperly penalize those who are sentenced after trial.   Nonetheless, he94
could plausibly contend that a discount focusing only on the uncertainty of
conviction derives from the foreclosed possibility of acquittal and not the
relinquished exercise of trial rights.
Judge Bazelon’s shadow-of-trial theory is flawed, however, in that it does
not describe what typically occurs in plea bargaining.   Prosecutors and95
judges do not shy from discounting based on adjudication costs avoided.96
Where the likelihood of conviction at trial is seemingly assured, the parties
commonly strike deals in part because of the anticipated costs of the trial that
a guilty plea would obviate.   Also, in cases where acquittal seems possible,97
bargaining takes into account not only the uncertain outcome, but the time,
effort, and other costs that can be anticipated in pursuing a trial conviction.98
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surrendering his chance of acquittal at trial.”); Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 1975 (“In
purchasing procedural entitlements with lower sentences, prosecutors buy that most valuable
commodity, time.  With time, they can prosecute more criminals.”); Uviller, supra note 33, at
102 (asserting that bargaining saves “the time, effort and risk entailed in the trial”).
99. See supra notes 96-98.
100. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1935 (“Criminal trials are costly for
defendants, and even more so for prosecutors.  These costs can be saved, and the gains split
between the parties, by reaching a bargain early in the criminal process.”).
101. See, e.g., id. at 1949 (asserting that trades focused on adjudication costs “appear to be
paradigmatic value-enhancing bargains of the sort that the system ought to enforce”).
102. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 659-60 & n.16.
103. See id.
More recent academic commentary defending plea bargaining based on
shadow-of-trial efficiency theory acknowledges that bargaining typically
discounts for both the outcome uncertainties and the adjudication costs of
trials.99
The question remains whether plea bargaining that accounts for expected
adjudication costs improperly penalizes those who resist.  Contrary to the
implication in Judge Bazelon’s opinion in Scott, the next section of this article
argues that the failure to confer such discounts on those sentenced after trial
does not penalize defendants who opt against plea bargaining.  Before
proceeding, however, it should be clear that shadow-of-trial efficiency theory
has no bearing on this question.  As espoused by its most prominent academic
proponents, the theory contemplates that bargains will incorporate discounts
for adjudication costs avoided.   However, the theory merely assumes this100
conclusion.   As a result, it offers no response to the claim that bargained101
discounts for such costs effectively impose a trial penalty on defendants who
are sentenced after trial.  An explanation outside of shadow-of-trial theory
would have to answer this contention.  This article now turns to that
explanation.
B. Post-Trial Sentences as Deserved Punishment; Bargained Sentences as
Utilitarian Leniency
The notion of deserts explains the justness of post-trial sentences despite
the lower sentences imposed through bargaining.  Defendants receiving post-
trial sentences get the deserved punishments for their crimes.  Bargained
sentences involve the extension of leniency on risk-reduction and utilitarian
grounds from the maximum deserved punishment.  Critics of plea bargaining
do not accept this position.   They argue instead that the denial of a discount102
to those who are sentenced after trial amounts to punishment for the exercise
of trial rights.   They emphasize the lack of a desert explanation for the103
disparities and the relation between rewards and penalties, among other
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104. Id. at 659.
105. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45
(1976) (“Ask the person on the street why a wrongdoer should be punished, and he is likely to
say that he ‘deserves it.’”); John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishment, in ASSESSING
THE CRIMINAL 181, 183 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) (asserting that most
people would believe that treating criminals in accordance with their “deserts” is the essence
of justice).
106. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 318-19 (1998) (discussing
the difficulty of understanding and applying a deserts measure to criminal sentencing); H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 233 (1968) (“The
simple equivalencies of an eye for an eye or a death for a death seem either repugnant or
inapplicable to most offences, and, even if a refined version of equivalence in demanding a
degree of suffering equivalent to the degree of the offender’s wickedness is intelligible, there
seems to be no way of determining these degrees.”); WALTER KAUFMAN, WITHOUT GUILT AND
JUSTICE: FROM DECIDOPHOBIA TO AUTONOMY 71 (1973) (“[T]here is no crime at all of which
it could be said that those committing it clearly deserve a particular punishment.”); David
Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1626 (1992) (“[I]t has long
been a stock objection to retributivism that there is simply no workable way to determine just
what punishment a criminal deserves.”).
107. RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W. LOW,
CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2004).
108. Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493-94
factors. However, their arguments ultimately do not undermine the view that
trial sentences dispense appropriate retribution.
1. Deserts as a Limitation on Punishment
Post-trial sentences are appropriately understood as deserved punishment
for crime.  Those responsible for setting criminal sentences — legislators,
sentencing commissions, trial judges, and prosecutors — base their penal
decisions upon the precept of justice that “undeserved” punishment is
“indefensible on any theory.”   The idea that a person should not suffer104
undeserved punishment corresponds to deeply and widely held notions of
fairness in our society.   The force of this sentiment leads to the conclusion105
that the relevant actors in criminal sentencing do not desire to impose more
punishment after trial than they believe criminal offenders deserve for their
crimes.
This notion of deserved punishment can explain post-trial sentences,
although retributive theory does not lead to objective measures concerning the
maximum deserved punishment for each crime.   Notions of desert derive106
from “contemporary community morality.”   As Professor Stephen Morse107
has emphasized, “[i]t is possible in any society to rank the seriousness of
criminal offenses and to assign to each a punishment that the society at that
time considers proportional to the seriousness of the offense.”   While this108
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(1984).
109. Id.
110. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
111. Compare Editorial, Cruel and Unusual, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 15, 2005, at Local
6 (editorial concluding that twenty-five-year sentence imposed on former WorldCom chief,
Bernard Ebbers, for defrauding investors of $11 billion “seems excessive,” particularly given
that he is “a man of 63 with a heart condition”), with Ken Belson, WorldCom Head Is Given 25
Years for Huge Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A1, C4 (noting view of Michael J. Missal,
lead counsel to the examiner in the WorldCom bankruptcy proceeding that “[w]hat the judge
is saying here is Mr. Ebbers deserves a life sentence, and 25 years amounts to one”).
112. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Scholar Is Given Life Sentence in ‘Virginia Jihad’ Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A17 (discussing case in which federal trial judge, Leonie Brinkema,
described as “very draconian” the life sentence that she felt compelled to impose on Muslim
cleric, Ali al-Timimi, who was convicted of inciting others to commit acts of terrorism against
the United States).
113. See, e.g., id. (noting that the federal prosecutor in the al-Timimi case contended that the
defendant “deserves every day of the time he will serve”).
114. To the extent people believe that a particular sentencing statute improperly exceeds the
desert limitation in an effort to deter crime, they should also believe that the problem lies with
the statute, not with plea bargaining.  The answer in such a case is not to eliminate plea
bargaining so that all offenders would receive the undeserved sentence, but to change the statute
and still allow plea bargaining so that no defendant receives more than he deserves.
115. In some cases, judges intentionally impose undeserved punishment to penalize the
exercise of trial rights.  Where such behavior can be proven, it should be condemned.  When
a “judge . . . manipulates posttrial sentences to ‘punish’ those who refuse to plead guilty,” she
acts improperly.  Church, supra note 1, at 519.  This article does not mean to minimize this
problem, and, indeed, contends that appellate courts should carefully scrutinize claims that such
conduct has occurred.  Nonetheless, this kind of improper behavior does not inhere in plea
bargaining.  Id.  The failure to confer a discount from deserved punishment is not the same as
the conscious imposition of a penalty beyond what the offender deserves.  See infra text
assignment may not be “an invariant, objective deserved punishment,” it is
“the deserved punishment at that time and in that place.”109
Disagreements will often arise about the maximum deserved punishment
for a criminal act, but these disputes only underscore people’s belief in the
deserts limitation.  People argue about whether a punishment is deserved
because they believe it important that an offender not receive more
punishment than he deserves.  Except in the death-penalty context, the
Supreme Court has given states substantial leeway under the Constitution in
prescribing criminal punishments.  Consequently, criminal sentences will110
often cause controversy.   A sentence that many people will see as excessive111
retribution  will typically strike many others as entirely deserved.   This112 113
diversity of views underscores the impossibility of declaring a sentence
deserved according to any objective measure.   The disagreements do not114
undermine the notion that the relevant players in the criminal process believe
in the deserts limitation.115
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accompanying notes 135-37.
XXxProsecutors also sometimes pursue and are able to secure a punishment after trial that they
believe is undeserved, merely because they wish to encourage plea bargaining.  Criminal codes
are expansive, and criminal prohibitions are often pliable.  Through their broad charging
powers, prosecutors wield substantial power over sentencing, particularly in jurisdictions that
have employed sentencing guidelines like those used in the federal system.  See generally
Stuntz, supra note 18.  The recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
will cause significant changes in this guideline approach and may produce more checks on
federal prosecutorial power.  See generally M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for
Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533 (2005).  In any event, improper behavior by prosecutors also does
not inhere in plea bargaining.  A prosecutor need not pursue post-trial sentences that she
believes are undeserved to encourage most defendants to accept deals.
XXxUltimately, this article disagrees with those who would contend that prosecutors frequently
seek and judges often impose post-trial punishments beyond what they believe the offender
deserves because they wish to encourage plea bargaining.  That position seems unduly cynical.
116. But see IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797) (“The law concerning punishment is a categorical
imperative, and woe unto him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of
happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from punishment
or by reducing the amount of it . . . .”).
117. The protection has substantive and procedural sides.  The substantive side is revealed
in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), requiring reviewing courts to vacate convictions
that are not supported by sufficient evidence.  The procedural side is revealed in two distinct
lines of decision.  One line rejects jury instructions that shift to the defense the burden of proof
on an element of the offense.  See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).  The other line limits the
use of presumptions to establish the crime.  See, e.g., Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989);
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
118. Long before the promulgation of the U.S. Constitution, Blackstone declared it
indisputable that the margin of advantage should lie heavily with the criminal defendant: “[T]he
law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358.  This view continues to permeate the rules of
criminal procedure.  See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 190
(1966) (“Trial by jury is not an instrument of getting at the truth; it is a process designed to
make it as sure as possible that no innocent man is convicted.”) (quoting Lord Delvin); Sanford
While Americans have committed themselves to the idea that no person
should receive undeserved punishment, they are less convinced that every
person must receive all the punishment that he deserves.   The deserts notion116
operates in our criminal justice system much more powerfully as a limitation
on punishment than as a mandate for imposing it.  For this reason, the criminal
justice system requires proof at an extremely high level — beyond a
reasonable doubt — as a precondition to the imposition of the criminal
sanction.   Consequently, many who appear very probably to deserve117
punishment do not receive it.118
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H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication — A Survey and Criticism,
66 YALE L.J. 319, 346 (1957) (“If in this effort to insure that none but those guilty be convicted,
many guilty go free, the price is not too great in the long view of democratic government.”);
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry
in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990) (“In the Anglo-American tradition, the
social cost of factual error against the defendant . . . is deemed greater than the social cost of
factual error against the government . . . .”); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and
the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 461 (1989) (“Whether treated as a moral,
constitutional, or popular sentiment inquiry, the greater injustice is almost universally seen in
the conviction of the innocent.”).
119. Cooperation may bear on the offender’s deserts in addition to providing utilitarian
grounds for leniency.  See generally Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation,
Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2003).
120. See Uviller, supra note 33, at 130 (asserting that guilty pleas mean that “the righteous
demand for full retribution must fade”).
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
122. Id. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
123. The Justices have interpreted the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments to
proscribe not only punishments that are inherently inhumane but also those that are excessively
harsh in context.  The Court first struck down a punishment as disproportional nearly a century
ago, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).  With the possible exception of Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding the revocation of citizenship for war-
time desertion cruel and unusual punishment), all of the Court’s subsequent decisions striking
down punishments under the Eighth Amendment have rested on this excessiveness theory.  The
Court has found disproportionality in the punishment either in relation to the crime or to the
class of offender.  See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the death
In the sentencing context, this notion of deserts as a limitation means that
decision-makers concern themselves less that some offenders may escape part
of their deserved punishment than that someone might receive more than he
deserves.  As a result, differences in punishment will arise even among
offenders whose deserts are equivalent.  A trial judge might, for example,
agree with a prosecutor’s request for leniency due to the offender’s
cooperation in providing information helpful in prosecuting another case.119
She might conclude that a less severe sentence would better promote the
offender’s rehabilitation.  She might conclude that the offender’s incarceration
would throw his family of young children into exceptional disarray, and, on
that basis, she might opt for probation.  She might also conclude that the
benefits to the state of guilty pleas justify rewarding them with discounts.120
Acceptance of sentencing reductions among equally deserving offenders
does not offend the prohibition on Cruel and Unusual Punishments  or the121
Equal Protection Clause.   The Supreme Court has concluded that neither the122
proportionality mandate  in the Eighth Amendment  nor the Equal123 124
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penalty for retarded offenders); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(striking down the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman).
124. Courts have applied this mandate more stringently in death-penalty cases than in the
non-capital context.  See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 55-62
(3d ed. 2001).
125. The Court articulated this point most clearly in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), in rejecting claims based on a sophisticated study that revealed a high probability that
racial prejudice influenced death selection in Georgia.  The Court concluded that evidence of
inequity in the treatment of identically situated capital offenders would not mean that a death
sentence would become disproportional under the Eighth Amendment.  See id. at 308 (asserting
that, despite such disparities, McCleskey’s death sentence was “not disproportionate within any
recognized meaning of the Eighth Amendment”).  The Court also rejected an Equal Protection
claim because McCleskey had not established purposeful discrimination based on race by his
prosecutor or jury.  See id. at 292 (stating that equal protection violation requires proof “that the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose”).
126. See, e.g., id. at 312 & n.35 (noting that McCleskey might have avoided the death
penalty through a plea agreement).
127. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 5, at 220 (“But when defendants guilty of the same
crime are awarded different sentences for administrative reasons, such a discrimination cannot
be justified in terms of individual culpability.”); Alschuler, supra note 2, at 657-58 (“[I]t seems
unjust that when two virtually identical defendants have committed virtually identical crimes,
one should receive a more severe sentence than the other only because he has exercised his right
to trial.”).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 104-15.
129. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 160
(1966) (contending that a criminal who deserves death should not gain a reprieve simply
because another offender who equally deserves death escapes that penalty); John C. McAdams,
Protection Clause requires equality in sentencing according to deserts.   The125
Court’s decisions contemplate, for example, that many who deserve the death
penalty will not receive that sanction, precisely because they will plea bargain
to avoid it.   The deserts notion operates as an upper limitation, more than126
a mandate against leniency, which means that many will receive less
punishment than they deserve.
2. The Failure of Claims of Trial Penalty
Arguments that post-trial sentences reflect trial penalties have not
confronted the overriding point that post-trial sentences mete out appropriate
retribution.  Critics note that bargained discounts are often not themselves
based on deserts, and, as a result, there is inequality, according to a desert
measure, in the distribution of punishment.   While accurate, this conclusion127
does not subvert the view that post-trial sentences mete out deserved
punishments for crime.   A deserved punishment does not become128
undeserved merely because other defendants deserving the same punishment
receive a lesser sanction.129
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Racial Disparity and the Death Penalty, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 153, 167
(“The fact that you parked illegally and did not get a ticket does not relieve me of paying the
fine when I do get a parking ticket.”); Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A
Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (1986) (“Maldistribution of any punishment among those who
deserve it is irrelevant to its justice or morality.”).
130. Some commentators also point to the substantial size of the bargains in contending that
post-trial sentences carry a trial penalty.  See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 3, at 46-47 (noting case
involving plea offer of two to six years where maximum possible exposure after conviction at
trial would have been forty to eighty years).  The possible sentencing exposure after a trial
conviction is not the same as the probable post-trial sentence, and disparity assessments should
focus on the latter.  In any event, the size of the disparities bears on whether bargaining causes
some innocent defendants to plead guilty, which is a serious concern, see infra Part IV.B, but
does not weaken the conclusion that those sentenced after trial receive deserved punishment.
131. Although it is not clear that he advocates abolition or even major overhaul of the plea
bargaining process, Judge Gerard Lynch has articulated this point in an effort to explain why
bargained sentences are not unduly lenient: “It is not clear, however, why we should privilege
the sentences received by the tiny minority of defendants who go to trial as the ‘correct’
sentences, from which the sentences received by defendants who plead represent an unduly
lenient departure.”  Lynch, supra note 58, at 1401.
132. See id. (“In a system where ninety percent or more of cases end in a negotiated
disposition, it is unclear why the ‘discounted’ punishment imposed in that ninety percent of
cases should not rather be considered the norm.”).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
134. Although plea bargaining does not qualify, in some unusual circumstances, evidence
of irrational sentencing disparities would cast doubt on the desert judgments underlying the
more severe sentences.  This very sort of problem raises questions about the use of the death
penalty.  See Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and
the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083 (2004).  In the death penalty context, evidence from statistical
studies has revealed a high probability that racial factors sometimes influence prosecutors, when
they decide in which cases to pursue the death penalty, and jurors, when they decide which
capital offenders deserve death.  See id. at 2106-23.  The evidence of unconscious racial
discrimination by prosecutors and jurors against killers of white victims and against black
Critics of bargaining gain no ground by emphasizing the disproportionate
numbers of defendants who accept plea bargains.   Some have asserted that,130
because the bargained sentences predominate so heavily, the post-trial
sentences seem incorrect.   They assert that it is strange to say that the131
discount is offered in ninety percent of the cases and the proper punishment
is imposed in only the remaining ten percent.   However, the disproportion132
of bargained sentences arises because most defendants would strongly prefer
to avoid full retribution and because prosecutors and judges generally have
both risk-reduction and utilitarian reasons to make a deal that will help
defendants avoid it.   Given these explanations, the disproportion does not,133
by definition, imply irrational action that would suggest that post-trial
sentences are undeserved.134
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defendants undermines the conclusion that all death sentences are based on valid desert
assessments.  See id. at 2145-49.  However, bargaining is different.  Prosecutors bargain down
based on risk-reduction and utilitarian rationales, not racial discrimination.  Further, to the
extent that factors such as race correlate with who pleads guilty and who goes to trial, this
evidence alone would not show that racial prejudice influenced prosecutorial bargaining
practices and, thus, would not suggest that post-trial sentences were undeserved.
135. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 659 (“If the concepts of reward and penalty are
relative — if these concepts derive their meaning only from each other — the assertion that
some defendants are rewarded and none penalized is simply schizophrenic.”); Comment, supra
note 5, at 220 (“An accused who receives a harsher punishment than the court would have
decreed had he waived a costly and time-consuming trial pays a judicially imposed penalty for
exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights.”).
136. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 659-60 n.16 (“This inequality leads to a sense of
injustice, and it would be entirely appropriate for a defendant sentenced only to what he
‘deserves’ to conclude that, in one very clear sense, he has indeed been penalized.”).
137. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“The ‘normal’
sentence is the average sentence for all defendants, those who plead guilty and those who plead
innocent.  If we are ‘lenient’ toward the former, we are by precisely the same token ‘more
severe’ toward the latter.”); Alschuler, supra note 2, at 659 (“If it is possible to envision a
‘proper’ sentence for each offender, . . . an increase in this sentence when the offender has
exercised his right to trial can be seen as an inappropriate penalty, and a reduction in the
sentence when the defendant has pleaded guilty can be seen as a reward.”).
The argument for a trial penalty also cannot build on the notion that the
failure to receive a reward must be a penalty.  Critics assert, for example, that
a reward for abandoning trial can only sensibly be understood as a penalty for
going to trial.   However, notions of reward and penalty are not135
interdependent.  The fact that certain people receive rewards does not mean
that all others who did not receive a reward received a penalty.  The failure to
receive a reward does not constitute a penalty, particularly when one did not
do what was required to receive the reward.
Critics of bargaining have also asserted that the denial of a bargain-like
reward would be perceived as a trial penalty by those defendants sentenced
after trial and, thus, should be viewed as a trial penalty.   However, the views136
of defendants, even if they could be accurately discerned, are likely to be self-
serving.  Their perceptions should not determine whether the judiciary views
the sentencing disparities as a trial penalty.
Critics sometimes erroneously claim that a reward in pleading guilty
connotes a penalty for going to trial, because they posit the “normal” or
“proper” punishment for a crime as the average of the sentences imposed on
everyone found guilty of it — those who plead guilty and those who go to
trial.   This assumption preordains a finding of penalty.  Those who plead137
guilty receive less than the “correct” punishment, while those who go to trial
receive more.  If there are winners, there must be losers.  The argument does
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138. For an argument that a bargained sentence represents “the lowest reasonable sentence”
and that assumes that this is the “deserve[d]” punishment, so that a defendant has an
“inalienable right” not to be given more, see Kipnis, supra note 3, at 563-64.
139. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 660; see also Gifford, supra note 3, at 41 (“plea bargaining
undermines legislative intent on the correct punishment for defendants convicted of specified
crimes”); Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1979 (“plea bargaining seriously impairs the public
interest in effective punishment of crime”).
140. Kipnis, supra note 3, at 558-59.
141. Critics may believe that the elimination of bargaining would result in reduced post-trial
sentences due to the need to control incarceration costs. However, this utilitarian rationale for
reducing sentences is arguably no better than the utilitarian rationale supporting plea bargaining.
In any event, such a hypothesized outcome, particularly if thought spurred by such a utilitarian
consideration, would not mean that current post-trial sentences are undeserved.
142. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 2009 (asserting that plea bargaining is inefficient
and treats defendants unfairly); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 2015 (“Plea bargaining is, for
the most part, efficient and fair.”).
not explain why sentences imposed after trial are undeserved.  It simply
assumes the conclusion that they are improper.  However, a theory that
declares any sentence above the average as problematic is insensible.138
In the end, critics of plea bargaining who allege a penalty in post-trial
sentences generally do not claim that it would be wrong to increase all
punishments to the post-trial level.  Indeed, one of their further criticisms of
bargains is that they “fail to accomplish the legitimate purposes of the criminal
law”  and that defendants who bargain “receive less than the punishment139
they deserve — an injustice.”   These assertions underscore that their140
arguments are actually about the impropriety of the discounts, not about the
impropriety of sentences imposed after trial.   Their arguments avoid rather141
than rebut the conclusion that post-trial sentences reflect deserved
punishment.
IV. Fairness to Defendants Who Accept Plea Offers
While defendants sentenced after trials are not appropriately viewed as
penalized by the existence of plea bargaining, the question remains whether
defendants who plead guilty based on bargains are treated unfairly.  Both
defenders and opponents of plea bargaining have implied that shadow-of-trial
efficiency theory helps resolve this problem by defining when plea bargaining
is acceptable.   However, this part shows that the theory actually leads us142
wildly astray with respect to the fairness of bargains to defendants who accept
them.  Most bargains that are inefficient according to shadow-of-trial theory
do not treat these defendants unfairly.  Likewise, some bargains that are
efficient under that theory, in particular those involving innocent defendants,
are troubling.  This part ultimately defends plea bargaining, despite the
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143. This conclusion does not depend on shadow-of-trial efficiency theory.  Many critics of
bargaining would claim that even factually guilty defendants accepting even accurately
discounted bargains are mistreated.  See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 695 (arguing the
impropriety of “burdening of constitutional rights up to the point at which people are as likely
to waive them as to exercise them”).
144. A plea offer gives the defendant a choice that he otherwise would not have had, and
“other things being equal, more choice is better than less.”  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at
1918; cf. United States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005) (in upholding plea deal in
which petitioner had agreed to probation with searches not based on reasonable suspicion, Judge
Posner noted: “Often a big part of the value of a right is what one can get in exchange for giving
it up.”).
145. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1913.
146. See, e.g., id. at 1919-34.
147. See id.; see also Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 311-16.
148. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1940 (asserting that the parties hope to
“reach an efficient allocation of risks and entitlements”).
problem with innocent defendants, and does so without reliance on shadow-of-
trial theory.  It starts with the unfairness claim as it relates to factually guilty
defendants and then addresses the special issues raised by the specter of
factually innocent defendants who plead guilty.
A. Factually Guilty Defendants Who Plead Guilty
Plea bargaining is fair as a matter of substance and process to factually
guilty defendants who accept deals.   Regarding substantive outcomes, these143
defendants do not receive undeserved sentences.  They receive a lesser
sanction than they deserve.  As for process, they are also not mistreated.  Trial
rights are entitlements, and no theory derived from a concern about fairness
to defendants plausibly explains why the law should prevent defendants from
bartering those entitlements in their own self interest.   Norms of144
“autonomy” support this freedom of exchange.   Traditional contract law145
does not suggest that the exchange amounts to duress or is like a contract of
enslavement or is otherwise unconscionable.   Professors Scott and Stuntz146
have already provided an impressive analysis of these possible criticisms of
bargaining and have shown why they are unpersuasive.147
Nor do plea bargains become unfair if they depart from an accurate
discounting of trial outcomes.  Shadow-of-trial efficiency theory miscalculates
the fairness of plea bargaining to those defendants who accept deals.  The
theory implies that a bargained sentence that is either higher or lower than an
accurately discounted one is inefficient and, thus, unacceptable.   However,148
with regard to factually guilty defendants, neither of these scenarios present
a case of either coercion or an undeserved sentence, which is why shadow-of-
trial efficiency theory confuses more than it enlightens.
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149. Critics of plea bargaining do not allege that guilty defendants who accept plea bargains
generally receive punishments that exceed the deserts limitation.  One of the critics’ further
complaints about bargaining is that, at least for factually-guilty defendants, the deals impose less
punishment than the defendants deserve.  See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 660, 679
(asserting that plea bargains “fail to accomplish the legitimate purposes of the criminal law” and
abandon “the legitimate objectives of the criminal sanction”); Gifford, supra note 3, at 98
(declaring that plea bargaining provides “unwarranted leniency in sentencing”); Kipnis, supra
note 3, at 558-59 (contending that defendants who bargain “receive less than the punishment
they deserve — an injustice”); Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 2009 (concluding that plea
bargaining undermines “the public interest in effective law enforcement and adequate
punishment of the guilty”).
150. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1919-34.
151. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (holding that the two-part test of ineffective
assistance from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), applies to representation by
defense counsel leading to guilty plea).
152. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (concerning discovery and inspection).
153. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (concerning procedures to be followed at guilty-plea
proceeding).
If the bargained sentence is higher than the accurately discounted trial
outcome, the defendant still suffers no injustice as long as his sentence does
not exceed what he deserves.  The defendant simply does not receive the full
value of the utilitarian benefits that he confers on the prosecution.  However,
a bargained sentence that is inefficiently high is not more coercive than an
accurately discounted one.  The inefficiency also does not mean that the
sentence is undeserved.  If the defendant receives less than full retribution, he
deserves his punishment even if, on utilitarian grounds, one might have
expected him to have gotten more value from his barter.149
The defendant who accepts a bargained sentence that is less than an
accurately discounted trial outcome presents an especially odd claim of
mistreatment.  Under classical contract law, the inefficiency does not convert
the bargain into a coerced transaction.   The defendant only receives an150
unusually good deal.  He receives more than the utilitarian value of his
relinquished entitlement.  As for the fairness of the outcome, the sentence is
far below what the defendant actually deserves.
The unimportance of accuracy in the discounting process reveals why
structural and psychological impediments to accurate discounting lack
practical relevance to whether plea bargaining is fair to defendants who accept
deals.  Certain basic protections regarding the competence of defense
counsel,  the discovery of information from the government,  and the151 152
formal receipt of guilty pleas,  help ensure that defendants who plead guilty153
are not seriously duped about their choices.  Nonetheless, the structural and
psychological deficits noted by critics of plea bargaining surely do impede
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154. See generally Bibas, supra note 9.
155. However, plea bargaining is not unfair to defendants who go to trial.  See supra Part
III.
156. Professor Bibas has listed the major impediments, and they predominately fall on the
side of causing inefficient harshness:
The most powerful factors doubtless include the strength of the evidence and the
likely sentence after trial, the two factors embraced by the shadow-of-trial model.
But factors unrelated to the merits also loom large.  I suspect that lawyer quality
and experience, lawyer funding and workload, pretrial detention, the operation of
mandatory or other lumpy sentences, and perhaps information deficits play the
largest roles.  Denial is a severe problem in certain categories of cases, such as sex
offenses.  The influence of overconfidence, risk preferences, framing, and
anchoring appears to be more subtle.  Lawyers debias enough to keep the number
of trials relatively low.  To encourage pleas, however, they may often use distorted
frames and anchors that impair clients’ evaluations of bargains.  Many of these
clients might have pleaded guilty regardless, but these influences probably affect
the sweetness of the deals that they receive and are willing to accept.
Bibas, supra note 9, at 2530.
157. Shadow-of-trial efficiency is a construct.  Neither of the components making up the
discount — risk reduction over litigation uncertainties and adjudication costs avoided — are
easily measured if they are measurable at all. Regarding litigation uncertainties, one could arrive
at the proper discount by multiplying the probable post-trial sentence by the fractional odds of
acquittal.  However, even the parties can only estimate the probability of acquittal and, in many
cases, the post-trial sentence upon a conviction.  Regarding adjudication costs avoided, the
breadth of factors included is ill-defined, and, unlike with a discount for uncertainty, it is not
possible to translate their value into a sentence reduction using an objective measure. 
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
accurate discounting.   These problems often cause trials.  Not surprisingly,154
shadow-of-trial efficiency theory implies that trials result from inefficient
bargaining.   Likewise, many inefficient deals are struck.  The nature of the155
most important problems that critics have identified suggests that deals tend
to be inefficiently punitive rather than inefficiently lenient.   Because the156
efficiency of a bargain is not measurable, we cannot be sure, nor can we know
how inaccurate the discounting.   However, none of this matters as long as157
it does not appear that defendants are accepting bargains that impose
punishment in excess of the deserts limitation.  Critics of bargaining offer no
such contention.158
B. Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty
The phenomenon of factually innocent defendants pleading guilty raises a
special concern about plea bargaining.  Plea offers made to these defendants
involve no inherent coercion or unconscionability.  The same conclusions
based on autonomy that apply to factually guilty offenders apply with equal
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159. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
160. See, e.g., Aschuler, supra note 2, at 715 (asserting that the bargaining process “seems
well-designed to produce the conviction of innocent defendants”); Gifford, supra note 3, at 59
(asserting that plea bargaining promotes “unjustified or inaccurate guilty pleas”); Langbein,
supra note 3, at 16 (contending that plea bargaining poses an “increased danger of condemning
an innocent man”); Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 2009 (contending that plea agreements “inflict
undeserved punishment on innocents”).  
161. Although the frequency of these cases is unclear, there has long been evidence that they
occur.  See, e.g., MICHAEL L. REDELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN
SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 282, 286, 286-87, 294, 305,
309, 318, 326, 328, 331, 333, 336, 338, 342 (1992) (noting cases from past decades involving
persons who pled guilty in potentially capital cases and who were subsequently exonerated).
An empirical study of recent exonerations also shows that innocent persons sometimes plead
guilty.  See SAMUEL R. GROSS ET AL., EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989 THROUGH
2003, at 12 (2004) (noting that approximately six percent of cases in the database of
individually exonerated persons had been convicted through guilty pleas and that two cases of
mass exonerations due to large-scale police corruption involved very large proportions of
convictions based on guilty pleas), http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/
publications/exonerations_20040419.
162. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
163. G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 179 (2d ed. 2004) (“Usually, the judge will
require the government to summarize the evidence in the case and ask the defendant to state
whether the summary is correct.  Alternatively, the judge might develop the factual basis on the
record by having the defendant describe the conduct giving rise to the charge.”).
164. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Judge Tosses Out Iraq Abuse Plea, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2005, at A1, A11 (reporting that, after the defense called a witness on sentencing who suggested
defendant’s innocence, military trial judge stated, “[Y]ou can’t plead guilty and then say you’re
not” and vacated guilty plea by Pfc Lynndie England to charges in connection with Abu Ghraib
abuse scandal); James Sterngold, 70’s Radical Reaffirms Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2001, at A16 (discussing decision of trial judge to bring defendant Kathleen Soliah, also known
force to factually innocent defendants.   Unlike the factually guilty offender159
who pleads guilty and receives deserved punishment, however, the factually
innocent defendant who pleads guilty does not deserve any sanction.
Current law and practice surrounding plea bargaining reflect ambivalence
about this problem.  American lawmakers have not abolished plea bargaining
to prevent innocent people from pleading guilty, despite both warnings from
academics that bargaining promotes false guilty pleas  and convincing160
evidence that they sometimes occur.   The Supreme Court has also161
concluded that a trial court can accept a guilty plea from a defendant who
proclaims his innocence as long as a strong factual basis for the plea exists.162
At the same time, many trial judges take precautions to try to prevent guilty
pleas by innocent persons.  At the guilty-plea proceeding, many judges require
the defendant to assent to or even recount in his own words a story of guilt as
a prerequisite to entering the plea,  and they will rescind the plea before163
sentencing if the defendant proffers a claim of innocence.164
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as Sarah Jane Olson, back to court to either confirm guilt or have prior guilty plea vacated after
she told reporters immediately after the plea that she had pled guilty although she was innocent).
165. See GROSS ET AL., supra note 161.
166. See id. at 12.
167. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 80 n.97 (1988) (distinguishing the situation of the “innocent but highly
risk-averse defendant from that of the guilty but less risk-averse defendant”); Scott & Stuntz,
supra note 10, at 1948 (“Innocent defendants are probably highly risk averse relative to guilty
defendants.”).
168. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 714-15 (asserting that prosecutors “tailor their
offers not to balance but to overbalance a defendant’s chances of acquittal”); cf. Welsh White,
A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 450-51 (1970)
(noting that prosecutors in New York and Philadelphia commonly offered large concessions in
apparently weak cases and that “this prosecutorial practice may compel innocent defendants to
plead guilty”).
169. By “exoneration,” the researchers required “an official act declaring a defendant not
guilty of a crime for which he or she had previously been convicted.”  GROSS ET AL., supra note
161, at 1.  Further, they required that the acquittal have been based on “strong evidence of
factual innocence” and that there not have been countervailing physical evidence suggesting
guilt.  Id. at 1-2 n.4.  They also excluded any case in which it appeared that the defendant had
“play[ed] a role in the crime” even if found not guilty.  Id.
170. The greater difficulty has two explanations.  First, a guilty-plea conviction, as opposed
to a trial conviction, may leave fewer avenues for challenge on legal grounds, and, thus, fewer
opportunities for a retrial at which evidence of innocence will exonerate the defendant.  Second,
there may also be a widespread sense that innocent persons rarely plead guilty but that persons
convicted at trial are more frequently innocent, which could make voluntary legal and
investigatory assistance after direct appeal less forthcoming to those who have pled guilty. 
The number of innocent defendants who accept bargained guilty pleas is
uncertain.  Recent empirical evidence hints that, at least in serious cases, far
fewer innocent persons plead guilty than proceed to trial.  A study of official
exonerations in the United States from 1989 through 2003,  led by Professor165
Samuel Gross, found that less than six percent of the persons exonerated (19
out of 328) had pled guilty.   Particularly if many innocent defendants who166
go to trial are acquitted, this figure does not support claims that innocent
defendants are generally more risk averse regarding trials than factually guilty
defendants  or that prosecutors frequently persuade innocent defendants with167
irresistibly low plea offers.   Those relying on this study, however, should168
do so cautiously.  The proportion of false convictions due to guilty pleas
probably exceeds the exoneration figure from the study,  because pleading169
guilty, as opposed to being convicted after trial, likely makes subsequent
exoneration more difficult.   The Gross researchers also noted two unusual170
mass-exoneration cases, not included in the study, in which large proportions
of innocent defendants pled guilty, suggesting that many innocent defendants
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171. The researchers described these as “two incidents of mass exonerations of innocent
defendants who were falsely convicted as a result of large scale patterns of police perjury . . . .”
GROSS ET AL., supra note 161, at 10.  One was the Ramparts scandal in Los Angeles and the
other the Tulia scandal in a small town in Texas.  The researchers noted that “the majority of
the 100 or more exonerated defendants in the Ramparts scandal” pled guilty to offenses they did
not commit as did “31 of the 39 Tulia defendants.”  Id. at 12.
172. See id. at 12 (“It is well known, for example, that many defendants who can’t afford bail
plead guilty in return for short sentences, often probation and credit for time served, rather than
stay in jail for months and then go to trial and risk much more severe punishment if
convicted.”).
173. See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 10, at 1967 (“By following appropriate contract
models, one can devise different rules that reduce the harm to innocent defendants and
meanwhile reduce transaction costs and inefficiency for everyone else.”).
174. Professor Schulhofer has acknowledged that the inefficiency of plea bargaining under
shadow-of-trial efficiency theory does not help us think about the problem of innocents.  He
notes that “economic theory is incapable of demonstrating” that “the value of autonomy and the
two-party gains of voluntary contracting outweigh the social costs of convicting the innocent.”
See Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 1986.  At the same time, Professor Schulholfer seems to view
the value of autonomy in this context as quite low, see id. (describing the denial of bargaining
as merely “inconveniencing” the innocent), and the social costs of allowing innocents to plead
faced with a seemingly strong government case will opt for the bargain.   In171
addition, while the study focused only on cases involving death or a long
prison term (where exoneration efforts generally focus), more innocent
offenders may enter bargained guilty pleas in minor cases.   Hence, the172
Gross study does not definitively show the proportion of innocent defendants
who accept plea offers, although it confirms that some innocents do succumb.
Does the fact that innocents sometimes plead guilty call for reform?
Shadow-of-trial efficiency theory confuses more than it advances our thinking
about this question.  According to proponents of the theory who defend plea
bargaining, the law should enforce bargains that reflect accurate discounting
and, in contexts where discounting tends to be inaccurate, try to eliminate the
impediments to accuracy.   However, this efficiency polestar makes no sense173
in cases of innocent defendants.  An efficient plea bargain followed by the
discovery of evidence that incontrovertibly proves innocence should result in
exoneration, not enforcement of the bargain.  Likewise, inefficient plea offers
may be preferable to efficient ones in cases of innocent defendants.  If the law
seeks to discourage pleas by innocent defendants, inefficiently harsh plea
offers would serve this purpose.  If, instead, the law seeks to provide the
fairest outcome to innocent defendants short of outright dismissals of the
charges, the more inefficiently lenient the offers, the better.  Efficient
bargaining as a goal does little to remedy the problem of innocents.
Those who urge abolition of bargaining to save innocent defendants also
gain nothing by noting the inefficiency of most bargains.   Whether too high174
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guilty as quite high, see id. at 1985 (asserting that a false guilty plea produces “serious negative
externalities”).  This calculus undervalues defendant autonomy and exaggerates the social cost
of allowing innocents to plead guilty.  See infra text accompanying notes 175-76.
175. There is a public cost, in the form of lost confidence in the criminal justice system,
when a false conviction is exposed, but the Gross study shows that exonerations after guilty
pleas are rare and much less common than exonerations after trial convictions.  See supra text
accompanying note 161.
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. Policies that apply to the factually innocent defendant would also have implications for
the factually-guilty offender.  The central practical problem is that prosecutors cannot at the
pleading stage distinguish the few factually innocent defendants from the sea of factually guilty
ones.  This point must be considered regarding proposed reforms intended either to give
innocent defendants better plea deals or to discourage them from accepting deals.  For example,
substituting nolo contendere pleas for guilty pleas would apply not only to innocents but to
factually guilty defendants as well, which would “undermine key values served by admissions
of guilt in open court.”  Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1361, 1363 (2003).  Lawmakers could also consider proposals in the other direction, such as
those to limit plea discounts to fixed amounts, so as not to unduly tempt innocent offenders.
See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
or too low, the inefficiency does not mean that innocent defendants are better
off without bargaining.  Even in the face of an inefficiently harsh plea offer,
an innocent defendant may prefer the deal, and, certainly, he may prefer the
inefficiently lenient one.  A significant number of innocent defendants are
found guilty at trial, and the litigation process itself can be onerous and
expensive.  Consequently, denying the bargaining option would only
compound the horror for those innocents who would favor a bargained plea.
The argument for abolition based on the problem of innocent defendants gains
no traction by rebutting shadow-of-trial efficiency theory.
Ultimately, the situation of innocent defendants presents competing
concerns that the law cannot simultaneously remedy.  On the one hand,
concern for public trust in the criminal justice system does not warrant trying
to foreclose innocents from pleading guilty.  Abolition of plea bargaining
would harm innocent defendants by denying them a risk-reducing option.
This remedy would also not significantly further the public interest.  Any
public cost resulting from exonerations after guilty pleas is tiny  and is175
surely outweighed by the high costs of attempting to abolish bargaining.   On176
the other hand, lawmakers should not, out of concern for innocents, abandon
the meaning of the guilty plea, such as by replacing all guilty pleas with pleas
of nolo contendere.  That approach would not only promote erroneous
convictions but would also confuse the moral meaning of the criminal law by
allowing factually guilty offenders to accept deals while claiming their
innocence.177
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Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L.
189, 235-36 (2002) (proposing limited, fixed discounts as a way to give “the risk averse
innocent defendant . . . greater incentives to go to trial”); Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 2004-05
(proposing as a second-best reform fixed discounts).  However, such proposals, if not evaded,
deny the prosecutor bargaining flexibility in cases of factually guilty defendants at the same time
that they foreclose a desirable option to precisely those innocent defendants who would have
accepted a more substantially discounted bargain.  
178. Room remains for disagreement as to what bargaining approach best addresses the
dilemma of innocents.  Bargaining currently takes several forms and occurs in the context of
differing sentencing environments.  The federal sentencing guidelines attempt to limit to a fixed
percentage the discount for a guilty plea.  See Bibas, supra note 9, at 2535 (noting that “the
federal sentencing system awards a fixed discount of about 35% for all guilty pleas”).  Other
approaches, such as that employed in the local courts in Washington, D.C., involve bargaining
over charges and over sentencing recommendations  by the prosecutor but not over the precise
sentence.  Still other jurisdictions, such as New York City, have allowed bargaining between
the defense and the prosecution over precise sentences, with the trial judge exercising veto
power.  See White, supra note 168, at 446-48.  All of these approaches straddle the competing
objectives of allowing innocent defendants to plead guilty without generally abandoning the
moral meaning of a guilty plea. 
179. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
180. Jury nullification in criminal cases presents another example.  Judges tell jurors that
they must follow the law.  Yet, juries have the power to acquit even in the face of overwhelming
evidence of guilt.  See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, at 1027-28.  By giving juries
this nullification power without telling them about it, the law enables them to act “as a ‘safety
valve’ for exceptional cases, without being a wildcat or runaway institution.”  United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Given the dilemma, the current approach to bargaining is difficult to
improve.   The law allows plea bargains by innocent defendants, but does not178
encourage them.  Indeed, many trial judges take strong steps to try to
discourage these bargains.   The law sometimes reflects conflicted views179
about certain conduct.  The question of innocent defendants who wish to plead
guilty presents an example.   The desire to maintain both plea bargaining and180
the moral meaning of guilty pleas produces ambivalence about innocent
defendants’ decisions.
V. Conclusion
Plea bargaining is defensible, but efforts to rationalize it through shadow-
of-trial efficiency theory are a bust.  The shadow-of-trial efficiency theory
contemplates that bargaining generally produces deals that accurately discount
for adjudication costs avoided and the uncertainty of trial outcomes.  The
theory characterizes these accurately discounted deals as “efficient” and
implies that they maximize the utility of the parties and, further, that they have
social utility.  However, the theory is defective.  First, bargaining often does
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not involve accurate discounting.  Second, and more importantly, the notion
of efficiency that the theory promotes is an ill-considered measure of social
value and of fairness to defendants.
Unfortunately, attacks on shadow-of-trial efficiency theory have amounted
to attacks on plea bargaining.  Critics of the theory have focused on why plea
bargains do not commonly reflect accurate discounting.  They have shown that
impediments to accurate discounting are numerous and serious, and perhaps
irremediable.  They have followed with arguments that plea bargaining should
be abolished or seriously reformed.  Although important, these critiques of
shadow-of-trial efficiency theory miss its more fundamental flaw.  The
accuracy of discounting has no practical connection with the social utility or
fairness of plea bargaining.  Consequently, impediments to accurate
discounting lack practical import in evaluating bargaining.
Plea agreements serve the public interest and treat defendants fairly even
when the deals are not efficient according to shadow-of-trial theory.
Bargaining maximizes deserved punishment at a reasonable cost by allowing
prosecutors and judges to pursue many discounted sentences with the same
resources that they would otherwise use to pursue a single sentence after trial.
Because a trial can be traded for many guilty pleas, bargaining, as opposed to
no bargaining, maximizes deserved punishment under the constraints of our
current system even if deals do not reflect accurate discounts.  We could try
to eliminate bargaining to allow prosecutors and judges to seek many more
sentences that give defendants their full deserved punishment.  However, the
expense involved is plausibly thought inordinate.
Trading concessions for guilty pleas also does not mistreat defendants,
regardless of whether the bargains reflect accurate discounting.  As for those
defendants who are convicted after trial, their higher sentences are best
understood not as carrying a trial penalty but as deserved punishment for
crime.  As for defendants who accept bargains, their plea offers are not
coercive or unconscionable according to classical contract law.  The vast
majority also do not receive undeserved punishment.  The exceptions are the
innocent defendants who accept bargains.  They do not deserve their
punishment.  However, notions of autonomy support allowing even innocents
to accept deals as does the recognition that denying them the bargaining
option neither improves their position nor significantly serves the public
interest.
Plea bargaining adds a valuable option to our system for adjudicating
criminal cases.  Bargaining does not produce the same amount of punishment
as would a system without bargaining and does not accurately discount trial
outcomes.  We cannot expect government plea offers to replicate post-trial
punishments, and we should not care whether they accurately discount them.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
636 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  58:599
We prefer to trade some punishment to avoid the high costs associated with
a bargainless system, and we do not believe that trial outcomes provide the
only or even the best measure of social value or of fairness in criminal
adjudication.  For these same reasons, we can conclude that a system with
bargaining, rather than one without bargaining, serves the public interest and
the interests of defendants.  Bargaining has value even if it often ends outside
the shadow of trial.
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